Extracted text (via pymupdf)
34858 characters
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 WO IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA Jay Dinsbach, Guardian on behalf of Alexis Gabrielle Dinsbach, Plaintiff, v. Candice Harris, et al., Defendants. No. CV-18-03595-PHX-GMS ORDER Before the Court is Jay Dinsbach, Guardian on behalf of Alexis Gabrielle Dinsbach -Taxable Expenses (Doc. 190). in part and denied in part. BACKGROUND While Alexis used excessive force against her. At the time, Defendant was employed as a Detention Officer and supervised the dormitory where Ms. Dinsbach slept. On the morning of July 26, 2017, footage from several security cameras captured Defendant walking over the dormitory, reaching into the bunk, and repeatedly punching and kicking suffered injuries and was taken - 2 - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 to a medical facility for treatment. Ms. Dinsbach subsequently brought this action against Defendant, as well as alleged that Defendant Harris used unconstitutionally excessive force against her in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that Defendants Maricopa County and Penzone were (Doc. 1.) After screening and discovery, the Court granted summary judgment for Defendants Maricopa County and Penzone and dismissed claims against them on the merits, and granted summary judgment in favor on the issue of whether Defendant Harris used excessive force. (Doc. 138 at 20.) On November 1, 2021, Ms. Dinsbach was placed in a guardianship by an Arizona court. (Doc. 161-1 at 9.). Subsequently, substitute her guardian, Jay Dinsbach as the plaintiff in this action acting on her behalf. (Doc. 168.) After a trial solely on the issue of damages, a jury awarded Plaintiff a verdict of $180,000 in compensatory damages against Defendant Harris. (Doc. 180.) Plaintiff now seeks reasonable attorneys fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. (Doc. 190.) DISCUSSION I. Legal Standard As amended, the Civil 1985, and 1986 of this title, . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than § 1988. vior in Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 12 (1992); Higher Taste, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 717 F.3d 712, 715 (9th Cir. 2013). Such an alteration gainst the defendant from Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111. - 3 - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 To determine the amount of fees that a prevailing plaintiff is due, courts apply the lodestar method. Roberts v. City of Honolulu, 938 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 2019). - Id. (quoting Kelly v. Wengler, 822 F.3d 1085, 1099 (9th Cir. 2016)). multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on a case by a reasonable hourly Kelly, 822 F.3d at 1099. The number of hours reasonably expended on a case is Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008). Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). resumptively reasonable. Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, in the second step of the lodestar method, courts may in rare circumstances consider whether the fee award should be adjusted upwards or downwards in light of the Kerr factors.1 Id. Some Kerr factors are subsumed into the first step of the lodestar process and as a matter of law may not serve as independent bases for adjusting the fee award.2 Cunningham v. Cnty. of 1 The Kerr factors are: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the e, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. Morales, 96 F.3d at 363 n.8 (quoting Kerr v. Screen Guild Extras, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975)). 2 These subsumed factors include (1) the novelty and complexity of the issues, (2) the special skill and experience of counsel, (3) the quality of representation, . . . (4) the results obtained, Cabrales v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454, 1464 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated, 490 U.S. 1087 (1989), reinstated Morales, 96 F.3d at 364 n.9. - 4 - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 487 (9th Cir. 1988). II. Analysis A. Prevailing Party For purposes of § 1988, Plaintiff is a prevailing party because he obtained a judgment for money damages against Defendant. (Doc. 181.) in any amount modifies the Farrar, 506 U.S. at 113. That Plaintiff did not succeed on all claims against all Defendants, or that he obtained a smaller verdict than perhaps anticipated, is not relevant to determining whether Plaintiff is a prevailing party under § 1988. See Thomas v. City of Tacoma, 410 F.3d 644, 649 (9th Cir. 2005). iff who wins nominal damages is a prevailing party Farrar, 506 U.S. at 112. While relevant to determining the size of the fee award, it does not inquiry. Id. reasonableness of a fee Tex. State Tchrs. Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 793 (1989))); see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983) (noting where ved only against Defendant for $180,000, he is a prevailing party and eligible for reasonable fees.3 B. Lodestar Calculation Plaintiff seeks $302,268.50 in fees for work performed by five attorneys, two law clerks, and three paralegals over 1506.6 hours. (Doc. 191-1 at 12.) The Court will first 3 Defendant argues no fees should be awarded because Defendant would not be able to pay a fee award. (Doc. 198 at 4.) a court awards fees in favor of a prevailing defendant, see Miller v. Los Angeles Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 1987), the Court is unaware of any authority suggesting that a d prevailing party. - 5 - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 reasonableness of the hours billed in light of the success obtained. 1. Reasonable Rate In determining the reasonable hourly rate for attorneys and paralegals, the Court Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 2013). The relevant community is the District of Arizona, . Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446, 454 (9th Cir. 2010). As part of this inquiry, the Court must consider the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney or paralegal in determining whether their billed rate is reasonable. Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1205 06. The fee applicant Id. at 1206. attorneys (and their rates) are as follows: Ms. Anita Rosenthal ($450 per hour), Mr. Steven Dawson ($450 per hour), Mr. Sander Dawson ($300 per hour), Mr. Aaron Dawson ($150 per hour as a law clerk and $300 per hour as an attorney), and Ms. Alexandra Dawson ($250 per hour). The law clerks are Ms. Vanessa Albert ($150 per hour) and Mr. Brendan Hughes ($150 per hour) Ms. Sheri Sadler ($150 per hour), Mr. Steven Schubert ($150 per hour), and Ms. Carolina Johnson ($150 per hour). Plaintiff has provided the Court with declarations in support of timesheet, with information pertaining to their prior professional experience. Plaintiff has also produced a fee agreement signed by Plaintiff, his ward, and Mr. Sander Dawson. (Doc. 207.) There, Plaintiff agreed that if the Court were to award fees against Plaintiff, fees could be assessed at the following hourly rates: $500 per hour for Ms. Rosenthal and Mr. Steve Dawson, $399 per hour for all other attorneys, $125 per hour for paralegal support, and $50 per hour (Doc. 207-1 at 2.) Th light of their experience, skill, and reputation to determine whether each rate is reasonable in the District of Arizona. Ms. Rosenthal and Mr. Steve Dawson are the managing partners of Dawson & - 6 - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rosenthal, the law firm representing Plaintiff. While neither Ms. Rosenthal nor Mr. Dawson have substantial experience in § attorneys. Ms. Rosenthal has been licensed to practice in Arizona for forty-two years and has tried over thirty cases to verdict, primarily representing plaintiffs in bad-faith insurance litigation. She has previously handled a § 1983 excessive force case in Arizona. (Doc. 191-7 at 2.) Mr. Steven Dawson has been licensed to practice in Arizona for forty-one years and has tried approximately fifty cases to verdict. He has also previously handled a § 1983 excessive force case in Arizona. (Doc. 191-6 at 2.) Defendant does not object to their rate of $450 per hour. Moreover, their requested rate is $50 lower than what they represented to Plaintiff they would charge if the Court determined Plaintiff owed fees to Defendant. In light of their experience, skill, and reputation, and because Defendant does not object, the Court finds that their requested rate of $450 per hour is reasonable. Mr. Sander Dawson was the attorney primarily responsible for litigating Mr. practiced law in Arizona for almost seven years and has handled two prior § 1983 cases. (Doc. 191-4 at 3.) As with Ms. Rosenthal per hour. This rate is also $99 lower than what Plaintiff agreed to pay had Defendant obtained a fee award against Plaintiff. In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Mr. skill, and reputation. Mr. Aaron Dawson appears to have charged two different rates throughout his representation of Plaintiff: $150 per hour in 2018, and $300 per hour starting in 2019. Defendant objects to his higher rate starting in 2019, as he has not adequately justified the increase. (Doc. 200-4 at 1.). Mr. Aaron Dawson states that while he has been licensed to practice law in California since 2012, he became licensed to practice law in Arizona only in January 2019. (Doc. 191-8 at 2.) ation, Dawson & Rosenthal employs some attorneys who are not licensed to practice law in Arizona. (Doc. 191-4 at 4.) When these attorneys performed work for Plaintiff, they billed - 7 - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 their time as law clerks. Id. timesheet shows that he billed his time at $150 per hour before he was licensed to practice in Arizona, and at $300 per hour after he became licensed to practice. This rate structure is consistent with the billing structure used for other non-admitted attorneys in this case, and reasonable in light of Mr. Aaron Ms. Alexandra Dawson seeks a rate of $250 per hour. She has practiced law in Arizona for approximately six years, primarily in plaintiff-side civil litigation and bad faith insurance litigation. (Doc. 191-9 at 2.) Defendant does not object to her proposed rate, which is $149 lower than envisioned in the fee agreement. Consequently, the Court finds her proposed rate is reasonable in light of her experience, skills, and reputation. Mr. Brendan Hughes and Ms. Vanessa Albert seek a rate of $150 per hour. Both Mr. Hughes and Ms. Albert are licensed to practice law in California, but not Arizona. Consequently, they have billed their time on this matter as if they were law clerks. (Doc. 191-10 at 2); (Doc. 191-11 at 2.) Defendant does not object to their proposed rate of $150 per hour, and the Court finds it reasonable. Finally, Plaintiff seeks fees for the time expended by three paralegals on his case, at a rate of $150 per hour. Mr. Sander Dawson declares that each paralegal has over twenty- five years of experience. (Doc. 191-4 at 4.) However, agreement, he agreed to compensate paralegal time at a rate of $125 per hour. (Doc. 207 at 2.) The Court will not award fees at a higher rate than what had been represented at the outset of the litigation. See Alozie v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, No. CV-16-3944-PHX-ROS, 2021 WL 5578858, at *3 (D. Ariz. Nov. 30, 2021). Therefore, the Court will award paralegal fees at a rate of $125 per hour. 2. Reasonable Hours to assess their reasonableness. appropriate hours expended in the litigation and must submit evidence in support of those Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992). - 8 - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1202 (quoting Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1111). compensable. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. is determined as part of the initial lodestar calculation, rate, Gates, 987 F.2d at 1403. a. Excessive, Redundant, and Unnecessary Hours Plaintiff seeks compensation for 1506.6 hours of attorney, law clerk, and paralegal work. (Doc. 191-1 at 12.) In support, Plaintiff has submitted billing records for each attorney, law clerk, and paralegal. (Docs. 191-5; 191-6; 191-7; 191-8; 191-9; 191-10; 191- 11; 191-12.) Defendant objects to specific entries by all but three individuals: Ms. Dawson, Ms. Sadler, and Mr. Schubert. (Docs. 200, 202, 203.) re insufficiently particularized is not well taken. (Doc. 205 at 4.) The Local Rules require a It is not enough for an -are-excessive- Delevin v. Holteen, No. CV-12-00118-TUC-FRZ, 2016 WL 10721809, at *4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 26, 2016). ecific time entries and identify the basis for each objection.4 i. Unrelated Tasks in Single Entry Defendant clerks, and paralegals submitted billing entries that corresponded to work performed on 4 iff Paul Penzone, when those claims were dismissed on summary judgment and involved issues that Defendant did not herself raise. (Doc. 198 at 6.) The Court will address this objection infra. - 9 - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 several unrelated tasks.5 issue amount to impermissible block billing, nor has he argued that specific entries contain related tasks that may be permissibly block billed under the local rules. See Pure Wafer, Inc. v. City of Prescott, No. CV-13-8236-PCT-JAT, 2014 WL 3797850, at *5 (D. Ariz. July 29, 2014) (allowing block-billed entries that were sufficiently related to each other). unrelated task performed on entirety, the Court agrees that most of the challenged entries do not comply with LRCiv 54.2(e)(1)(B). (See, e.g., Doc. 191-12 at 4 (billing entry by Ms. Johnson seeking 5.5 hours ) A billing entry that corresponds to work performed on several unrelated tasks does not aid the Court in its evaluation of whether the time performed on each specific task could have been reasonably billed to a private client. Therefore, the Court will apply a 20% reduction to block-billed hours, deducting as follows: 1.1 hours from Mr. Sander Dawson, 7.7 hours from Ms. Albert, 9.0 hours from Mr. Hughes, and 67.7 hours from Ms. Johnson. See Rindlisbacher v. Steinway & Sons Inc., No. CV-18-01131-PHX-MTL, 2021 WL 2434207, at *12 (D. Ariz. May 26, 2021) (reducing specific block-billed entries by 20% for failure to comply with LRCiv 54.2(e)(1)(B)). ii. Lack of Specifics Defendant next objects to 65.3 hours of billed time on the grounds that the billing entries at issue are insufficiently specific under the local rules.6 Local Rule 54.2(e)(2) 5 Defendant seeks to exclude 5.4 hours of work billed by Mr. Sander Dawson, 38.5 hours of work billed by Ms. Albert, 45.0 hours of work billed by Mr. Hughes, and 338.4 hours of work billed by Ms. Johnson. 6 14.3 hours billed by Mr. Sander Dawson, 2.9 hours billed by Ms. Rosenthal, 9.1 hours billed by Ms. Albert, 30.4 hours billed by Mr. Hughes, and 8.6 hours billed by Ms. Johnson. For Mr. Sander Dawson, Defendant challenges the following entries: 7/26/18 (0.7), 10/4/18 (1.2), 10/4/18 (1), 10/4/18 (0.8), 3/28/19 (0.2), 12/13/19 (0.5), 12/16/19 (0.5), 12/20/19 (0.1), 12/20/19 (0.1), 12/20/19 (0.1), 1/29/20 (0.5), 3/4/20 (0.2), 3/24/20 (0.1), 3/24/20 (0.1), 3/24/20 (0.1), 3/25/20 (0.1), 3/25/20 (0.1), 3/26/20 (0.1), 3/26/20 (0.1), 4/16/20 (0.1), 4/16/20 (0.1), 4/24/20 (0.2), 5/1/20 (0.1), 5/1/20 (0.1), 5/1/20 (0.1), 5/1/20 (0.1), 5/1/20 (0.1), 5/1/20 (0.1), 5/18/20 (0.1), 5/18/20 (0.1), 5/22/20 (0.1), 5/22/20 (0.1), - 10 - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 reasonableness of the cha states that researched and, if appropriate, should identify the pleading or document the preparation of are inadequate and the court may reduce the award accordingly. LRCiv 54.2(e)(2)(B). that most of the challenged time entries fail to comply with the specificity requirements of Local Rule 54.2(e)(2). Some challenged entries pertain to telephonic conferences or email messages that do not identify the purpose of the communication. For example, Mr. Sander 7 8 Other challenged entries pertain to legal research and the preparation of documents and pleadings, but do not identify the work performed with enough specificity for the Court to 5/28/20 (0.1), 6/30/20 (0.1), 6/30/20 (0.1), 6/30/20 (0.1), 6/30/20 (0.1), 6/30/20 (0.1), 6/30/20 (0.1), 6/30/20 (0.1), 11/30/20 (0.1), 12/7/20 (0.1), 12/7/20 (0.1), 12/16/20 (0.1), 12/16/20 (0.1), 4/19/21 (0.1), 4/21/21 (0.1), 4/21/21 (0.1), 5/20/21 (0.1), 5/20/21 (0.1), 5/21/21 (0.1), 6/17/21 (0.1), 6/18/21 (0.1), 6/29/21 (0.1), 6/29/21 (0.1), 7/12/21 (0.2), 7/12/21 (0.1), 7/12/21 (0.1), 7/19/21 (1), 7/23/21 (0.1), 7/23/21 (0.1), 10/25/21 (0.2), 11/15/21 (1), 11/23/21 (0.1), 11/23/21 (0.1), 11/23/21 (0.1), 11/24/21 (0.5), 12/2/21 (0.1), 12/3/21 (0.1), 12/3/21 (0.1), 12/6/21 (0.1). (Doc. 191-5.) For Ms. Rosenthal, the following entries are challenged: 7/19/21 (1), 10/15/21 (0.5), 11/15/21 (1), 11/29/21 (0.2), 12/14/21 (0.2). (Doc. 190-12.) For Ms. Albert, the following entries are challenged: 7/17/20 (2), 7/19/20 (0.5), 5/20/21 (1), 11/23/21 (2), 11/29/21 (0.2), 11/30/21 (0.4), 12/4/21 (2), 12/5/21 (1) (Doc. 190-14.) For Mr. Hughes, the following entries are challenged: 10/14/20 (1.18), 10/21/20 (3.03), 10/26/20 (3.3), 10/26/20 (0.23), 10/26/20 (1.5), 10/27/20 (1.35), 10/27/20 (0.17), 10/28/20 (3.68), 10/30/20 (0.18), 11/2/20 (0.43), 12/16/20 (2.97), 5/13/21 (0.67), 5/18/21 (0.62), 6/14/21 (2.32), 6/29/21 (0.75), 7/9/21 (1.07), 10/13/21 (1.12), 11/30/21 (0.18), 11/30/21 (1.7), 12/1/21 (2.25), 12/2/21 (0.75), 12/2/21 (0.9) (Doc. 190-8). For Ms. Johnson, the following entries are challenged: 6/30/20 (1.6), 8/21/20 (4.1), 7/21/21 (1.8), 10/13/21 (0.4), 10/14/21 (0.3), 10/18/21 (0.4). (Doc. 190-10). 7Billed 10/4/18 (1.0). (Doc. 191-5 at 2.) 8 Billed 5/1/20 (0.1). (Doc. 191-5 at 10.) - 11 - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 assess the reasonableness of the time billed. s 9 This entry makes clear that the research was conducted for Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendant but does not identify the specific legal requirements for specificity.10 Therefore, while the Court will reduce the number of hours i the following hours: 13.3 hours from Mr. Sander Dawson, 1.2 hours from Ms. Rosenthal, 2.1 hours from Ms. Albert, 30.4 hours from Mr. Hughes, and 7.5 hours from Ms. Johnson. In total, the Court deducts 54.5 hours. iii. Travel Diego, California to Phoenix, Arizona for court appearances and depositions.11 Ordinarily, See, e.g., Best Western Intern., Inc. v. Patel, No. CV-04-2307-PHX-JAT, 2008 WL 544820, at *4 (D. Ariz. Feb. 26, 2008). While all relevant entries appear to be related to the case, Mr. Sander Dawson has not explained why travel from San Diego was necessary. (Doc. 191-4 at 2.) Given his representations, the Court declines to consider his hours spent traveling from San Diego to Phoenix for case-related events in calculating the lodestar figure, as he did not bill for his time spent travelling from Sedona to Phoenix. Mr. Sander by 7.2 for purposes of the lodestar calculation. 9 Billed 10/14/20 (1.18). (Doc. 191-10 at 5.) 10 Challenged entries that are sufficiently specific are as follows: entries dated 7/19/21 (1.0), dated 7/17/20 entries dated 10/13/21 (0.4), 10/14/21 (0.3), and 10/18/21 (0.4). (Docs. 191-7, 191-11, 191-12.) 11 The relevant billing entries are as follows: 1/24/19 (1.4), 12/1/19 (1.5), 12/1/19 (1.4), 1/20/20 (1.5), 1/20/20 (1.4). (Doc. 191-5) - 12 - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 iv. Internal Meetings challenges as excessive.12 Generally speaking, it is reasonable for attorneys working on a case Best Western, 2008 WL 544820, at *4; see also Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1103 04 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (rejecting requested reduction for internal conferencing when . Most of the meetings at issue took place in the weeks immediately preceding trial, and the Court generally declines to second- eparation strategy. Therefore, the Court will not disturb the bulk of the challenged entries. However, some specific entries warrant reduction. Mr. Sander Dawson and Ms. Albert both billed 3.0 hours on November 17, 2021 to discuss a Motion to Substitute, potential settlement (Doc. 191-5 at 17); (Doc. 191-11 at 6.) The Court finds that the time billed for that meeting is excessive given the topics discussed and reduces both billed entries by 2.0 hours. The for a meeting held on May 21, 2021. (Doc. 191-7 at 5.) Finally, the Court will reduce Mr. Steve Dawson and Ms. Ros 1.6 hours each to discuss a Rule 35 examination is excessive.13 Therefore, the Court deducts 7.0 hours for excessive meeting time: 2.0 hours from Mr. Sander Dawson, 2.0 hours from Ms. Rosenthal, 1.0 hour from Mr. Steve Dawson, and 2.0 hours from Ms. Albert. 12 The relevant billing entries are as follows: (3.0), 11/26/21 (2.0), 11/27/21 (2.5), 11/28/21 (1.5), 11/28/21 (0.5), 12/2/21 (2.7), 12/3/21 (2.5), 12/4/21 (2.0), 12/4/21 (1.7), 12/5/21 (1.0), 12/5/21 (1.6), 12/6/21 (1.5), 12/6/21 (3.5), 12/8/21 (6.0) (Doc. 191-5) (1.0), 5/21/21 (1.0), 7/9/21 (0.5), 7/9/21 (1.0), 12/2/21 (2.7), 12/3/21 (2.5), 12/4/21 (1.7), 12/5/21 (1.6), 12/6/21 (1.5) (Doc. 191-7) (1.6), 12/2/21 (2.7), 12/3/21 (2.5), 12/4/21 (1.7), 12/5/21 (1.6), 12/6/21 (1.5) (Doc. 191-6); lling entry dated 12/14/21 (0.2) (Doc.191-8) billing entry dated 11/17/21 (3.0) (Doc. 191-11). 13 See billing entries dated 3/24/20 (Docs. 191-6, 191-7). - 13 - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 v. Non-Case Related Billing because a significant amount of her billed time is not directly related to the civil case against Defendant Harris. 1.4 hours for tasks including attempting to locate Ms. Dinsbach and communicating and coordinating with attorneys working on her probate and criminal cases.14 These entries are not properly charged against Defendant. Plaintiff does not provide a compelling justification why Defendant Harris should bear these costs. Therefore, the Court will exclude these entries from the lodestar calculation. vi. Other Objections Finally, Defendant challenges 82.8 hours billed for work she claims is overbilled or unnecessary.15 First, the Court will make reductions for hours billed by Mr. Sander Dawson, Ms. Albert, and Mr. Hughes for overbilling and unnecessary work performed.16 These reductions total 29.0 hours. As for Ms. Johnson, the Court will reduce her hours by 27.0 for overbilling the following categories of tasks preparing brief procedural motions, and (2) preparing deposition summaries.17 14 The relevant billing entries are: 7/22/20 (2.4), 7/22/20 (1.2), 8/5/20 (4.2), 8/17/20 (2.5), 8/17/20 (0.4), 9/3/20 (2.2), 11/11/20 (0.8), 1/27/21 (1.5), 2/3/21 (0.6), 2/10/21 (0.5), 2/18/21 (0.4), 3/10/21 (0.9), 3/11/21 (1.6), 3/11/21 (1.5), 3/15/21 (1.1), 3/30/21 (1.4), 4/2/21 (0.4), 6/4/2002 (4.2), 6/8/21 (3.3), 6/10/21 (3.4), 6/10/21 (0.8), 6/13/21 (3.5), 6/15/21 (3.5), 6/15/21 (0.8), 6/17/21 (3.9), 6/20/21 (2.8), 6/21/21 (2.5), 7/7/21 (4.5), 7/14/21 (0.8), 7/14/21 (1.8), 8/1/21 (0.5), 8/3/21 (1.8), 8/5/21 (0.6), 8/6/21 (2.5), 8/9/21 (4.5), 8/13/21 (1.8), 8/13/21 (0.8), 8/16/21 (5.5), 8/17/21 (4.8), 8/17/21 (4.2), 8/17/21 (0.8), 8/18/21 (0.7), 8/18/21 (2.7), 8/19/21 (2.9), 9/11/21 (1.6), 9/13/21 (2.7), 9/28/21 (0.9), 9/29/21 (2.5), 10/15/21 (4.5), 10/25/21 (0.8), 12/11/21 (4.9) (Doc. 191-12). 15 Challenges not addressed in this order are hereby overruled. 16 For Mr. Sander Dawson, the following entries are deducted: 9/20/18 (3.6), 7/10/19 (0.4), 12/4/20 (8), 8/6/21 (0.5), 11/29/21 (0.4). For Ms. Albert, the following entry is reduced to 2.0: 12/8/21 (7.0). For Mr. Hughes, the following entries are deducted: 10/13/20 (2.48), 10/26/20 (1.9), 3/8/21 (1.02), 10/15/21 (0.47), 10/19/21 (0.32), 10/20/21 (0.75), 10/21/21 (1.67), 10/21/21 (2.5) (Docs. 191-5, 191-11, 191-10). 17 Deductions are made from the following entries: 9/25/19 (0.2), 10/15/19 (0.2), 11/18/19 (0.4), 12/11/19 (0.2), 12/19/19 (0.2), 5/4/20 (0.5), 5/6/20 (0.3), 5/15/20 (0.2), 5/28/20 (0.2), 6/23/20 (0.2), 9/9/20 (0.4), 10/27/20 (2.8), 10/28/20 (0.2), 10/28/20 (2.4), 10/30/20 (4.5), 11/30/20 (3.2), 11/30/20 (1.5), 12/1/20 (0.4), 12/10/20 (0.3), 3/10/21 (3.2), 4/6/21 (0.6), 4/21/21 (0.3), 4/22/21 (0.3), 5/12/21 (0.5), 5/19/21 (0.6), 8/12/21 (0.5), 10/7/21 (5.9), 10/8/21 (5.8) (Doc. 191-12). - 14 - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 vii. Preliminary Hours for Lodestar Calculation Having made appropriate reductions to specific hourly entries, the Court determines the following hours will be used to preliminarily determine the lodestar figure. Name Hours Anita Rosenthal 23.0 Steve Dawson 13.0 Sander Dawson 367.3 Aaron Dawson 10.5 (4.2 at $150 per hour; 6.3 at $300 per hour) Alexandra Dawson 26.9 Vanessa Albert 119.7 Brendan Hughes 264.3 Sheri Sadler & Steven Schubert 52.7 Carolina Johnson 307.8 TOTAL 1185.2 b. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff should not be compensated for hours billed for work on claims against Defendants Maricopa County and Sheriff Penzone because the Court granted summary judgment on those claims. (Doc. 198 at 6.) pla Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440). The Ninth Circuit applies a two-step process to de the plaintiff fail[ed] to prevail on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Claims if either the facts or the legal theories Webb, 330 F.3d at 1169. If the successful and unsuccessful it is impossible to isolate the truly unrelated claims from those related claims, id., reductions for limited success should - 15 - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 instead be made at Hensley , which asks the plaintiff achieve[ed] a level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award, Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. i. Relatedness of Claims asserted four counts against three defendants. All four counts are related for purposes of Hensley . See Webb, 330 F.3d 1169. Count I sought § 1983. (Doc. 1 at 10.) Count II sought to impose Monell liability against Defendants Maricopa County and Sheriff Penzone for Defendant Harris 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1 at 12.) In Count III, Plaintiff sought relief on a vicarious liability theory against the County and Sheriff Penzone for Defendant Harris and battery. (Doc. 1 at 14.) And Count IV sought to recover against the County and Sheriff Penzone for their negligent hiring, training, and supervision of Defendant Harris. (Doc. 1 at 16.) All four counts arose out of a common factual background, namely Defendant Harris They are therefore related. See Webb, 330 F.3d at 1169 (determining the including a municipality ii. Level of Success Under Hensley where the plaintiff has obtained limited success on his pleaded claims, and the result does not confer McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009); see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440. A plaintiff confers a meaningful public benefit when McCown, 565 F.3d at 1105. In this case, the jury awarded $180,000 in compensatory damages on a single claim. Looking back at the case, Plaintiff sued Defendants Harris, Penzone, and Maricopa County; - 16 - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 one count against Defendant Harris, and the remaining three asserted against Defendants Penzone and Maricopa County. (Doc. 1.) After screening, the Court permitted the case to go forward against all named Defendants. (Doc. 8.) At summary judgment, the Court denied Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of whether Ms. Dinsbach was compe statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-821.01(A), (D), but granted their motion on the merits and dismissed for Summary Judgment on Count I because Defendant Harris admitted that at least some at 18 19.) On the first day of the trial set to determine the proper amount of damages, the Court granted Plai I. (Doc. 187 at 1.) After closing arguments on the third day of trial, the jury deliberated for approximately two and one half hours before returning its verdict. (Doc. 189 at 1.) Plaintiff did not obtain an excellent result in this case because most of the counts in his complaint were dismissed on the merits and he voluntarily dismissed his claim for punitive damages. Nor is the Court aware of any meaningful public benefit that arose from 1983 damages award acts as a deterrent against misconduct to a certain degree, Plaintiff has not shown that his action resulted in any changes in policy or practice that make future rights violations of similar nature less likely. Cf. Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1147 (9th determined plaintiffs accomplished their mission to improve the disability determination system in Oregon through class action litigation). Because Plaintiff obtained only limited success throughout the litigation, the Court will reduce the fee by 25%. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440. Courts regularly reduce fee awards when a plaintiff brings multiple claims against several defendants but prevails only on one claim against a single defendant. See - 17 - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 McCown by 20% because he prevailed on only one of nine claims); Webb, 330 F.3d at 1169 70 (reducing award by 25% for limited success . In reaching this determination, the Court is mindful of the costs associated with successfully litigating a § 1983 case to verdict and the important role § 1988 and its fee- shifting provisions play in attracting attorneys to prosecute civil rights cases. The 25% success in litigating his case against all defendants named in his complaint. c. Final Lodestar Calculation In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court calculates the lodestar amount as follows: Name Proposed Hours Hours Awarded Rate Awarded Tentative Fees Reduced Fees Anita Rosenthal 26.2 23.0 $450 $10,350.00 $7,762.50 Steve Dawson 14 13.0 $450 $5,850.00 $4,387.50 Sander Dawson 403.8 367.3 $300 $110,196.00 $82,647.00 Aaron Dawson 4.2 4.2 $150 $630.00 $472.50 6.3 6.3 $300 $1,890.00 $1,417.50 Alexandra Dawson 26.9 26.9 $250 $6,725.00 $5,043.75 Vanessa Albert 136.5 119.7 $150 $17,955.00 $13,466.25 Brendan Hughes 314.74 264.3 $150 $39,643.50 $29,732.63 Sheri Sadler & Steven Schubert 52.7 52.7 $125 $6,587.50 $4,940.63 Carolina Johnson 521.3 307.8 $125 $38,471.25 $28,853.44 Total 1506.64 1185.2 $238,298.25 $178,723.70 - 18 - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 C. Nontaxable Expenses Plaintiff also seeks reimbursement for $8,349.11 of nontaxable expenses incurred. Under § -of-pocket expenses that Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1216 n.7 (9th Cir. 1986), , 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1987)). Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for (1) travel expenses, (2) deposition videographer fees, (3) online research expenses, (4) copies, postage, and delivery services, and (5) miscellaneous costs, interview with Defendant. (Doc. 191-3 at 2 3.) Defendant Harris objects to any award of nontaxable expenses, arguing that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that the costs are those which are typically billed to clients in the local community. (Doc. 198 at 7.) Because Mr. Sander Dawson has not justified why travel from San Diego was necessary for the case, see supra Part II.B.2.a.iii, the Court deducts $1063.94 from reasonable, adequately documented, and would be typically billed to clients in the local community. The Court has adjudicated many fee and cost petitions, and finds that attorneys routinely bill their clients for these types of expenses. See, e.g., Agster v. Maricopa Cnty., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1017 20 (D. Ariz. 2007) (allowing prevailing party to recover costs expended on meals, videotaped depositions, copying expenses, electronic legal research expenses, postage, messenger services, mileage, cab fare, parking, and Pacer fees). Plaintiff is awarded $7285.17 in nontaxable expenses. CONCLUSION Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Related Non-Taxable Expenses (Doc. 190) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff is awarded $178,723.70 $7285.17 in related nontaxable expenses, for a total award of $186,008.87. - 19 - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED d for Attorneys Fees and Related Non-Taxable Expenses as timely filed. Dated this 11th day of March, 2022.